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Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
6.1 Introduction
In the literature on the pre-World War I international gold standard,
Canada has a prominent place (e.g., Viner 1924); in the literature on the
interwar gold standard, Canada is but a footnote. Onereason is obvious.
Between the wars Canada was only legally "on gold" for two-and-a-half
years (1 July1926-January1929), andevenduringthis periodthegovern-
ment was not strongly committed to the gold standard as a monetary-
control'mechanism. In practice if not always in spirit, Canada was a
flexible-exchange-rate country (Chisholm 1979; Knox n.d.).
Nonetheless, at least two aspects of Canada's interwar monetary ex-
perience should be of interest to students of the gold standard. On the
one hand, the restoration of gold convertibility at the prewar ex-
change-rate parity with the U.S. dollar was accomplished with none of
the controversy and strife that accompanied, for example, the British
return to gold. While the smooth return to gold was obviously condi-
tioned by many factors affecting commodity and factor markets and the
Canadian balance of international payments, appropriate monetary
adjustments were crucial. These were accomplished without a central
bank or other effective monetary control institutions. Indeed, Canada's
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experience might be interpreted as evidence of the irrelevance of a
central bank.
On the other hand, although the gold standard was reestablished
painlessly, at the first sign of stress it was again abandoned. In terms of
timing, Canada, not GreatBritain, led the world offthe gold standard. It
has been argued that the 1929 suspension ofconvertibility was a result of
thegovernment'sfailure tocontrolthe moneysupply. Therewere institu-
tional gaps in the Canadian financial system that severely limited the
effectiveness ofavailable instruments ofmonetary policy. We conclude,
however, that the suspension of the gold standard was not a failure of
monetary policy, but a plausible response to the virtual impossibility of
operatinga gold standard mechanism in theface ofserious externalstress
with imperfect monetary-control institutions and very narrow gold
points.
6.2 The Institutions
6.2.1 The Pre-World War I Canadian Monetary System
Canada adopted the gold standard in 1853. By 1913 it had crystallized
into what Keynes called a "fixed fiduciary issue" system (Keynes 1930,
p. 237). Legal tender was either gold coin or Dominion notes, a govern-
ment-issued currency. Beyond a basic fiat issue ($22.5 million), these
notes were subject to a 100 percent gold reserve. Chartered bank notes
circulatedalongside Dominionnotes, butwere notlegal tender, and bank
deposits were ofincreasing importance. Banks were required to convert
their notes and demand deposits into Dominion notes (or gold) on
demand and for this purpose held substantial reserves ofboth Dominion
notes and gold. However, there were no constraining cash-reserve
requirements.
1
The Bank of Montreal acted as the government's fiscal agent and on
rare occasions performed some central-banking functions (for example,
during the financial crisis of 1907). However, there was no central bank;
indeed, the very concept was anathma to a large part of the banking
industry (McIvor 1961, pp. 109-11).
6.2.2 The Suspension of Gold Convertibility, 1914
In early August 1914, following the outbreak of war in Europe and
fearing a banking crisis and a run on its gold reserves, the Canadian
government released the banks from theirstatutoryobligation to convert
bank notes into legal tender and suspended the convertibility of Domin-
ion notes into gold (PAC Finance Records, group 19, box 105, p. 2893).
However, the statutory price of gold was not changed, and the gold-
reserve requirement for Dominion notes issued at the initiative of the279 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
government was not suspended. These provisions meant that legally the
government could not directly issue Dominion notes without purchasing
theirfull gold backing, and hence could not directly use monetary expan-
sion to finance government expenditures. While the suspension of gold
convertibility relaxed the external discipline of the gold standard (the
specie-flow mechanism was not allowed to work), a powerful discipline
on direct money creation by the government remained which imparted a
deflationary bias to monetary policy when Canadawas offgold and thus
contributed to the return to gold.
We must immediately qualify the statement that the gold-reserve re-
quirement was not suspended. In partit was. The Finance Act permitted
the banks to borrow Dominion notes from the Department of Finance,
and notes issued at the initiative ofthe banks under this provision had no
gold-reserve requirement. This was the institutional basis for allegations
that the gold standard and the Finance Act were incompatible (Cour-
chene 1969; Elliott 1934).
6.2.3 The Finance Act: The Government as Lender-of-Last-Resort
By permitting the minister of finance to make unlimited advances of
Dominion notes to the banks, secured only by collateral "approved by
the minister," the Finance Act created a discount window, but made no
provision for the other functions of a central bank. There was no board
charged with comprehensive responsibility for monetary policies and no
agency for conducting open-market operations (and no open market in
which to operate).
Lines of Credit
Administrative arrangements for the discount window varied, but by
1920 the practice of operating within negotiated lines ofcredit was well
established. The practice entitled banks to advances up to a specified
limit, on demand, at the posted interest rates. Additions could be negoti-
ated at any time, but all lines of credit expired on 1 May each year.
In general, lines ofcredit were not a constraint on the banking system.
Between 1920 and 1935, on average, advances amounted to only 16
percent ofaggregate lines ofcredit, and in 100 ofthe 180 months, to less
than 15 percent. Borrowing reached 25 percent of aggregate lines of
credit in only 30 months, and the maximum usage was 39 percent
(November 1929). At no time did the banking system have less than 60
percent of authorized lines of credit available for immediate use.
The Advance Rate
Under the 1914 Finance Act, the interest rate on advances (the ad-
vance rate) could not be less than 5 percent, although a 1917 order-in-
council permitted special advances to the banks, secured by British280 Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
treasury bills, at 3.5 percent per annum. These special advances aside,
the advance rate was 5 percent for the duration ofthe 1914 act. In 1923 a
new FinanceActremoved the5percentfloor. Therecordofinterestrates
on advances is set out in table 6.1. The rate was not adjusted flexibly.
During the twenty-year history of the act, the ordinary advance rate
(applicable to loans secured by any eligible collateral) was changed only
eight times and provisions were made for special advance rates (appli-
cable to loans secured by special issues ofgovernmentsecurities) on only
ten occasions. By contrast, over the same period the Bank of England
changed its bank rate thirty-eight times and the Federal Reserve Bankof
New York its discount rate forty-five times.
6.2.4 Dominion-note Issues
The three components of the Dominion-notes issue for the period
1920-34 are plottedon figure 6.1, with periods when the Canadian dollar
was at or above par distinguished by shading from periods when the
dollar was at a significant discount. The behavior of these series tells
much of our story.
Table 6.1 Advance Rate, 1914-34
22 Aug 1914-19 Oct 1917
20 Oct 1917-1 Apr 1922
2 Apr 1922-31 Oct 1924
1 Nov 1924-31 Oct 1927
1 Nov 1927-30 Nov 1927
1 Dec 1927-8 Jun 1928
9 Jun 1928-31 Aug 1928
1 Sep 1928-30 Nov 1930
1 Dec 1930-9 Oct 1931
10 Oct 1931-26 Oct 1931
26 Oct 1931-1 May 1932
2 May 1932-13 Oct 1932
14 Oct 1932-31 Oct 1932
1 Nov 1932-2 Nov 1932
3 Nov 1932-30 Apr 1933
1 May 1933-31 Jul 1934





































aAdvances outstanding as of8June were payable at 3.75 percent; the rate on new advances
was 5.0 percent as was the rate for all advances by banks which withdrew gold.
bApplicable to advances which the banks were required to take by statute, 1 November
1932, renewed 1 November 1934.281 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
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Dominion-note issues, 1920-32.
The"otherfiat note"series is comprisedofthelegal fiat issue and, until
May 1926, notes issued as a special wartime loan to GreatBritain. While
this series shows several important drops early in the period, it is other-
wise constant. Themajorvariationsarein notesissued as advances andin
the gold-covered issue?
The difference in the behavior of gold-backed notes and advances
under the two exchange-rate regimes is striking. When the Canadian
dollar was at a discount, the gold-backed issue displayed little variation,
in spite ofwide fluctuations in total Dominion notes. By contrast, there
were wide fluctuations in advances, including obvious seasonal fluctua-
tions. But, when the Canadian dollar was at or above par, the gold-
backed issue fluctuated widely, particularly seasonally, in sympathywith
the total issue. Advances were relatively stable seasonally and generally
declined over time. The run up of advances in 1927-28 is an important
exception which will be of concern later.
The interaction between advances and gold-backed Dominion notes
for the adjustment of bank reserves and the monetary base, under the
two exchange-rate regimes, is interesting but not surprising. When Can-
ada was on gold, reserves were available to the major banks at the
relatively trivial cost ofshipping gold from New York. Providing that the
relevant New York interest rates were lower than the advance rate, this
method ensured the least-cost adjustment of the banks' cash positions.
Each year, when seasonal pressures pushed the Canadian dollar through
the gold import point, major gold inflows occurred. But when Canada
was offgold, the effective price ofgold was the product ofthe fixed U.S.282 Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
price (US $20.67 per ounce) and the exchange rate. However, this gold
could only be carried on a bank's books, paid into circulation, or con-
vertedinto Dominionnotes, atthefixed statutoryprice ofCan$20.67 per
ounce. The addition to Canadian bank reserves would not even pay for
the gold purchasedin New York. When Canadawas offgold, the Finance
Act was the least-cost method of adding to bank reserves.
6.2.5 The Instruments of Monetary Policy
Although the Finance Act did not create a central bank, it obviously
provided potential instruments for the management of the monetary
base. We can distinguish between those instruments affecting the quan-
tity and those affecting the price of base money.
Onthe quantitative side, themostobviousmonetary-policyinstrument
was control over lines ofcredit, butthere were otherpossibilities as well.
Although in principle advances were available on demand under estab-
lished lines ofcredit, moral suasion was a useful management tool as was
the restriction of the eligible-collateral supply. The fiduciary issue was
fixed by law, but the government was not above finding ways around the
law; in principle, as long as convertibility was suspended, the gold-
covered issue was also subject to management. On the price side, the
instrument was the advance rate, at least after 30 June 1923. In the
absence of reserve requirements, we find no instruments for managing
the money-supply multiplier, apart from moral suasion.
6.3 The Return to Gold, 1920-26
From the deep discount ofWorld War I, the Canadian dollar returned
briefly to par in mid-1922, fell to a discount again in 1923, and returned
definitively to par in mid-1924, although legal convertibility was not
restored until July 1926 (figure 6.2). There can be little doubt that the
depreciation during World War I resulted from excessive monetary ex-
pansion (Curtis 1931b; Deutsch 1940; Knox 1940). Figure 6.3 suggests
thatthere was also a monetaryexplanationfor the return to parity. Inthe
early 1920s Canada experienced a monetary contraction that was both
greater (18 percent versus 9 percent for M2) and more prolonged (twen-
ty-four versus eighteen months) than that in the United States. Perhaps
more significant was that while the U.S. money supply recovered sharply
from its trough in 1922, the Canadian money supply remained substan-
tially unchanged through mid-1924.
No significant change occurred in the ratio ofMl or M2 to the mone-
tary base (figure 6.4). However, with the exception oflate 1922 through
mid-1923 (the period of renewed depreciation), there was a steady de-
cline in the monetary base during the re'turn to gold (table 6.2 and figure
6.5).3 Although some fluctuations in monetary gold holdings are evident,283 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
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Fig. 6.2 Discount from prewar gold parities: Canadian dollar and
pound sterling, 1913-26.
particularly seasonal fluctuations when the Canadian dollar was at par
(late 1922, 1924-26), over the period as a whole the entire contraction
occurred in the fiat component of the base and, if we focus on the years
1920-24, almost entirelyin advances. There was no central bankto force
the monetary adjustment. Did the government nonetheless use the
potential instruments of policy to this end?
6.3.1 Quantitative Measures: Lines of Credit
To a bank, an unused line of credit was a costless liquid asset that
guaranteed almost instant access to legal tender. In principle, control
over lines of credit was like control over cash reserves.
Figure 6.6 shows three major reductions in aggregate lines of credit
between 1920 and the resumption of legal convertibility (May 1922, 38
percent; May 1923,27 percent; and May 1925, 17 percent), which sug-
gests the possibilityofdeliberate restrictive monetarypolicyin supportof
a return to gold. However, our research suggests not.
Examination of applications and authorizations, housed in the Public
Archives ofCanada, for lines ofcreditfor the years 1920-26, revealed no
evidence that the reductions ofMay 1922 and May 1923 were induced by
thegovernment. Thereductions appearto have beenthebanks' reactions
to the generally lowerlevel ofprices and hence lowerdemandsfor credit.
The May 1925 cuts were at the government's initiative, but involved only
two banks. Each cut was justified on the grounds that the bank's request
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Table 6.2 Adjustment of the Monetary Base during the Return to Gold,
June 1926-June 1926 (millions of dollars)
Levels
1914 1920 1922 1924 1926
Gold 138.3 182.0 170.0 164.5 178.4
Banks8 46.6 91.5 84.8 68.3 86.0
Governmentb 91.7 90.5 85.2 96.2 92.4
Fiat Dominion notes 22.5 201.5 147.5 114.1 83.3
Legal fiat issue 22.5 63.5 63.5 63.5 63.5
Finance Act 0 88.0 44.0 19.2 19.8
Imperial Treasury bills 0 62.5 0 0 0
Other 0 25.6 44.0 19.2 19.8
British issue 0 50.0 40.0 31.4 0
TOTAL MONETARY BASE 160.8 383.5 317.5 278.6 261.8
Changes
1914-20 1920--22 1922-24 1924-26 1920--26
Gold + 44 -12 -...Q +14 - 4
Banks + 45 - 7 -17 +18 - 6
Government - 1 - 5
+ 11 - 4 + 2
Fiat Dominion notes +179 -54 -33 -31 -118
Legal fiat issue + 41 0 0 0 0
Finance Act + 88 -44 -25 + 1 - 68
Imperial Treasury
bills + 62 -62 0 0 - 62
Other + 26 +18 -25 + 1 - 6
British issue + 50 -10 - 9 -31 - 50
TOTAL MONETARY BASE +223 -66 -39 -17 -122
8Bank gold abroad included in the monetary base. 1914 = 17.2; 1920 = 17.3; 1922 = 15.1;
1924 = 14.8; 1926 = 14.4.
bGovernment excess gold reserves excluded from the monetary base. 1914 = 1.0; 1920 =
5.1; 1922 = 0.3; 1924 = 0.5; 1926 = 2.6.
plan to restrain the borrowing ofeither bank or to reduce the borrowing
capacity of the banking system as a whole. We conclude that deliberate
restriction of lines of credit was not an instrument used by the govern-
ment in support of the 1924 return to parity.
We have had no success in ourattempts to incorporate unused lines of
credit in an econometric analysis ofthe banks' demandfor cash reserves.
This result may bereasonable, indicating that the banks regarded lines of
credit as free goods about which careful calculations did not have to be







/ ! \ ....... ! \ .I \ __ J \
MONETARY BASE
\







, q~20 1q:21 1q-~2 1923 1q24 1925 1926 ! 927 1928 ! 929 1910 H~31 !93:2 1q33
vEAR















1920 192] 192219231924192519261927192819291930 193] 1932 1933
vEAR
Fig. 6.6 Lines of credit and advances, 192G-32.287 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 192~35
6.3.2 Quantitative Measures: Collateral for Advances
The Floating Canadian Debt
A consequence of the financing of World War I was the creation of a
sizable floating debt-nonmarketable, short-term Treasury bills held
exclusively by the banks. Bearing interest between 5.5 and 6 percent
when the advance rate was 5percent, these bills were prime collateralfor
advances under the Finance Act. On two occasions, December 1919 and
May 1922, the minister offinance attempted to retire some issues before
maturity; at least the 1922 case appears to have been partly a deliberate
effort to reduce the fiat issue of Dominion notes.
In early December 1919, the government sought the agreement ofthe
banks to retire before maturity $125 million of the $208 million floating
debt. The banks agreed to $110 million. The monetary consequences,
however, appear to have been trivial. Other collateral was readily avail-
able, and the general level of interest rates was well above the advance
rate. As a result, repayments ofadvances amounted to only $6.8 million,
a small fraction of total advances outstanding at that time ($113 million
on 30 November).
TheMay 1922 effort was much more controversialbecause the govern-
ment sought to retire the entire floating debt. Interest rates, however,
had dropped sharply and sound lending opportunities had dried up.
Treasury bills bearing interest at 5.75 percent or 6 percent were very
attractive assets for the banks. Several bankswere recalcitrant, andin the
end the minister only insisted on the retirement of those bills that had
been pledged as collateral for advances. His stated objectives were to
reduce "asfar as possible that portion ofthe Dominion-note issue which
is notsecured by gold" and, as a matterofcontinuing policy, "toincrease
ourpercentageofgold held against Dominionnoteissues" (PACFinance
Records, group 19, box 101, p. 3510). Only$49.1 million (or34 percentof
the floating debt) were in fact retired, and only a small ($16 million),
temporary drop in advances was experienced. The 1922 episode can be
interpretedas an attemptto implementquantitative monetarypolicy, but
the measure was restrictive probably because the advance rate was high
in relation to otherinterest rates and in relation to bank-lendingopportu-
nities. At best the policy was a modest operation whose effects would
have occurred in any case when the bills matured in a few months.
The Floating British Debt
More important, quantitatively, was the retirement of the British
floating debt, a product of Canada's wartime financial assistance to
Britain (White 1921; Deutsch 1940; Curtis 1931b; Knox 1940). The
floating debt was in two parts: a $50 million loan of Dominion notes by288 Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
the government ofCanadain 1917 (the "Britishissue"), and a succession
of loans by the Canadian banks, aggregating $230 million.
The British issue violated the Dominion Notes Act butwas legal under
the War Measures Act. Upon the expiration of most orders under the
latter act on 1January 1920, the British issue was probablyillegal, butits
legality was never questioned. In April 1922 the British government
began making $5 million monthly payments to the Canadian government
to repay the loan and retire the Dominion notes, but the Canadian
government used only the first two payments to retire Dominion notes,
reducing the British issue to $40 million. The issue remained at this level
through February 1924 and was then reduced in two jumps to $31.4
million (March 1924) and$14.4 (December 1925), before beingretiredin
May 1926.
Thus, between mid-1920 and mid-1924, the reduction of the British
issue amountedto only $19 million, about5percentofthe 1920 monetary
base (table 6.2). Had the entire British repayment been applied to the
British issue, the monetary base would have been reduced by 13 percent
by late 1922. The government's search for ready cash thus significantly
moderatedthe contractionofthe moneysupply, transferringthepressure
to 1925 and 1926, after the prewarparity was again well established. This
story is not one about a government doggedly pursuing a restrictive
monetary policy in suport of a return to gold.
More significant in the early stages of the return to gold was the
retirement ofthe British debt to the banks. These loans were substitutes
for direct governmental loans, and in the negotiations the government
was afar from apassive intermediary. Ineffect, the government assumed
a variable residual participation, offering to the banks the discount
facilities ofthe Finance Act at a special advance rate. To the extent that
this facility was used, the loans had an inflationaryeffectonthe monetary
base; but because the bills were not all discounted, the inflationary effect
was smaller and less permanent than would have been the effect of a
direct issue of Dominion notes ofthe same amount. Ofthe $230 million
loaned to the United Kingdom by the banks, less than half were dis-
counted at any time. As the imperial Treasury bills were retired, ad-
vances fell steadily.
Again it must be stressed that the quantitative impact of debt retire-
ment on the fiat issue ofDominion notes was, indirectly, a product ofthe
level of the advance rate. The banks had large lines of credit and abun-
dantcollateral. Hadthe advance rate beenin accord with market rates or
perhaps below them, some part of the reduced fiat issues would have
been replaced through the discounting of other securities.
6.3.3 The Advance Rate
In ourinterpretation, the setting ofthe advance rate was the key to the
monetary contraction necessary for the return to gold, even though it is289 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
unlikely that the government initially conceived ofthe advance rate as an
instrument for monetary regulation. The Finance Act of 1914 was a
temporary emergency measure, and although the Treasury Board was
given discretion to set a rate above the floor, it is very unlikely that there
would have been a legislated floor ifthe advance rate had been designed
as a policy instrument. (TheTreasuryBoarditselfwas a bodyresponsible
for overseeing the government's fiscal position, not for managing mone-
tary policy.)
1914-20
From its introduction in 1914 until 1924 the advance rate was un-
changed, except for the introduction and expiration of the special ad-
vance rate to facilitate Britain's borrowing in Canada. Almost as soon as
the rate was set at 5 percent, interest rates dropped sharply in New York
(figure 6.7) so thatthe Canadianrate becamevery much a penaltyrate. It
is not surprising that little borrowing was done in the first few years, and
mostofthatbysmallerbanksthatdid nothave low-cost access totheNew
York money market. Through mid-1917, the Finance Act was not an
instrumentfor inflationaryexpansionofthe moneysupply. However, the
3.5 percent special rate for advances secured by imperial Treasury bills
establishedin October1917soonbecamecompetitivewith therising New
York call-loan rate, and by 1918 even the ordinary advance rate was
below New York levels. In 1919 and 1920 the differential between the
advance rate andNew York rates becameveryintense, andin April 1920
the minister offinance was advised by his majoradviser, the president of
the Bank of Montreal, to abolish the 3.5 percent special rate because it
was so low as to promote "over trading" (PAC Finance Records, group
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on 21 May 1920 announcing the abolition of the special rate (PAC
Finance Records, group 19, box3514). No reply is preservedin thePublic
Archives, but evidence from the ledger books shows that advances were
made subsequently at the 3.5 percent rate, suggesting that the new policy
was opposed by the banks and not implemented. Not only was the
ordinary advance rate not raised when central banks around the world
were raising their discount rates, this modest proposal for restrictive
advance-rate policy came to naught.
1920-24
When the imperial Treasury bills were retired, the advance rate was
effectively increased from 3.5 percent to 5 percent. More importantly,
while the New York call-loan rate remained in the 6-7 percent range
through 1920, in 1921 and 1922, like most short-term rates, it plunged to
low levels. With the Canadian advance rate fixed at 5 percent, what had
been an inflationary interest-rate differential now became a deflationary
differential. The advance rate thus contributed to the return to gold, not
as a matter ofdeliberate policy but by the accident ofthe drafting ofthe
1914 Finance Act and the technique adopted to finance British wartime
purchases in Canada.
When the 1923 Act removed the 5 percent floor, the advance rate was
notchanged. Althoughwe have no direct evidence, it is plausible thatthe
governmentwas attempting to supportthe again-falling Canadiandollar.
Consistent with this interpretation, the rate was not lowered in the fall of
1923 to support the seasonal expansion of the money supply, but it was
lowered in 1924 when the Canadiandollarwas strong. In this respect, the
government behaved like agold-standard central bank; apparently Can-
ada was learning about monetary policy British-style. However, two
points should be noted. First, advances under the Finance Act were at a
low ebb in 1923. The 5 percent advance rate would have discouraged
banks from taking advances to increase their reserves, but it could not
have been intended to induce further retrenchment; no such retrench-
mentwas possible. Second, unlike the British bankrateorthe New York
discount rate, the advance rate was not directly linked to any open-
market interest rates in Canada. There was no open money market of
consequence, and even the broad psychological effects normally attrib-
uted to changes in the bank rate could not have occurred. Changes in the
advance rate were a private affair between the government and the
banks. We have discovered only oneinstance (September1928) when the
change in the advance rate was noted in the press.
6.3.4 The Gold-Reserve Ratio
Although we can find little evidence ofquantitative monetary policy in
support of a return to gold, we have noted one attempt involving early291 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
retirement of floating debt that was justified as improving the gold-
reserve ratio. Two other examples of similar policies can be cited that
probably had little impact on the return to gold but which suggest the
government's general frame of mind. We noted earlier that when the
Canadian dollar was at par, the seasonal expansion ofbank reserves was
effected by the importation ofgold. Theseasonal demand for money and
the seasonal strength ofthe current account combined to push the Cana-
diandollar throughthe goldimportpoint, andgoldflowed in. Howeverin
1922 and 1924 before the gold import point was reached, the government
used excess funds at its disposal to import gold, making the seasonal gold
adjustment for the banks. The government's purpose can only be sur-
mised, but it seems likely that it was attempting to improve the gold-
reserve ratio (figure 6.8). The actions were probably unnecessary; the
normal working of the adjustment mechanism would probably have
pushed the Canadian dollar through the gold import point anyway, and
the effects on gold reserves were largely temporary.
6.3.5 Overview of the Return to Parity
We have not examined fully why Canada's return to gold was so
unremarkable. We have ignored the real factors affecting the balance of
payments and the behavior of labor and commodity markets and only
asked: How did Canada, without a central bank, make the monetary
adjustments necessary for the return to gold? Several points seemsignifi-
cant by way of summary.
1. We have no direct evidence of a conscious "grand design" of a
monetary policy to restore the gold standard, although, from time to
time, governmentpolicieswerepredicatedonimprovingthe gold-reserve
ratio. The theme of an eventual return to gold recurred in public and
private discussions of monetary affairs, but it was not a serious political
issue nor a subject of vigorous public debate. .
2. Themajorinstrumentofquantitative monetarypolicy, controlover
lines ofcredit, was notused. Indeed,we canpointtoonlytwo attemptsby
the Canadian government to implement quantitative monetary policy
(through the early retirement offloating debt), with but modest effects.
3. More importantwere the monetaryconsequences ofthe retirement
ofthe British floating debt, an accidental by-product ofthe settlement of
Canada-United Kingdom wartime financial affairs.
4. Until July 1923, the advance rate could not be lowered. In subse-
quent months, long after relevant market interest rates had fallen, the
government, for unknown reasons, chose not to lower the advance rate.
We argue thatthis was the most importantdecision affecting the returnto
gold. Not only was the 5 percent advance rate deflationary in its own
right, it created the conditions under which the retirement ofthe British







































































































































































































.293 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
5. Occasionally during the monetary adjustment, the government
showed the usual governmental penchant for accepting "easy money,"
e.g., the funds available by not retiring the "British issue" on schedule.
However, because of the 100 percent marginal gold-reserve ratio, the
governmentcouldnot resort to the expediencyofissuing Dominion notes
to finance expenditures. With the Canadian dollar at a discount, notes
issued by the government would not even pay for their own gold backing
let alone finance governmentexpenditures. We suspect that this remnant
of the gold standard, when Canada was officially off gold, was of pro-
found importance in conditioning the return to gold. It prevented the
government from following a directly inflationary policy.
6.4 The Suspension of the Gold Standard, 1928-31
4
Reestablished so easily, why was the gold standard suspended again so
quickly? It has been argued that the suspension was a direct consequence
of excessive monetary expansion, reflecting in part a "fundamental in-
consistency between the operations ofthe gold standard and the Finance
Act," and in part faulty government policy (Courchene 1969; Elliott
1934). However, this argument is misleading. Rather than a failure of
Canadian monetary policy, the 1929 suspension was a reaction to a
powerful external shock whose severe, immediate monetary conse-
quences could not be otherwise offset or contained. It demonstrated the
extreme difficulty faced by a country like Canada, with remarkably
narrow gold points, in adhering to the gold standard when the interna-
tional monetary environment was not tranquil.
6.4.1 The Monetary-Policy Hypothesis
The foundations of the monetary hypothesis can be seen in the be-
havior of the Canadian money supply, which increased somewhat more
rapidly than that ofthe United States in the late 1920s-orrather took a
noticeable relative jump in late 1927 (figure 6.9). Given the fixed ex-
change rate, however, the money supply was endogenous; its behavior
cannot explain what happened. Perhaps more relevant is the behavior of
the monetary base, particularly the sharp rise in fiat Dominion notes in
1928 (figures 6.5 and 6.10). A sharp increase in advances apparently
displaced gold from the monetary base-advances drove out gold. In
considering how this displacement might have happened, however, we
must remember that without a central bank or a government directly
managing the fiat issues ofDominion notes, the size and composition of
the monetary base were also endogenous. The only exogenous factors
were interest rates. A monetary-policy explanation of the suspension
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6.4.2 The Advance Rate
To explain the sharp increase in advances, Courchene points to the
lowering ofthe advance rate from 4.5 percent to 4 percent in November
andto 3.75 percentin December1927 (table6.2; figure 6.7). TheNovem-
ber adjustment was subsequently defended as necessary to keep the
advance rate in line with the discount rate ofthe FederalReserveBankof
New York, which had been reduced from 4 percent to 3.5 percent in
August 1927 (Hyndman 1928, p. 53), hardly a surprising policy for a gold
standard country with a stable exchange market. The December adjust-
ment was probably part ofthe same policy, but it had another important
consequence. To persuade the banks to purchase a special issue of
three-year 4 percent Treasury notes, the government made a commit-
mentto discount these notes at thenew advancerateof3.75 percent. This
"special advance rate" restricted the government's freedom of action
during the subsequent gold crises and initiated a new policy with respect
to the advance rate and the Finance Act mechanism.
The Advance Rate and the New Floating Debt
We will not explore in detail the new advance-rate policy, but it is
useful to note it in passing.
Most ofthe changes in the advance rate during the twenty-year history
ofthe Finance Act occurred after December 1927 (table 6.1). With four
exceptions (June 1928, September1928, May 1932, and May 1933), these
changes involved either a new special advance rate or a reduction in the
ordinary advance rate coincident with a new issue of short-term debt
placed directly with the banks. The advance rate was set to provide an
inducement to the banks to purchase the new governmentsecurities. The
government had discovered the potential of the Finance Act to support
government financial operations and used it repeatedly for that purpose.
However, the government also made one effort to use it for monetary-
policy purposes.
6.4.3 The First Gold Drain
Advances increased in the fall of1927, but not substantially, and there
was no drain ofgold. The major increase in advances and the beginnings
ofthe gold drain occurredlater, in mid-1928, afterthe dramaticrise in the
New York call-loan rate (figure 6.7).
The Policy Response: June 1928
It has been argued that the government did not understand the prob-
lem of the gold drain and did nothing (Elliott 1934). In fact, as the gold
drain began, the Department of Finance attempted an almost classic
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"gold device." To our knowledge, this was the first deliberate central-
banking operation in Canada.
The exchange rate went outside the gold export point on 31 May 1928.
On5,6, and7Juneonebankexchanged $7 million ofDominion notes for
gold. The next day the advance rate was raised to 5 percent for all new
advances secured by ordinary collateral and all new and outstanding
advances ofthose banks, "which hereafter withdraw gold" (PAC, Trea-
sury Board Records, group 55, box 645). Unfortunately, the monetary
effect ofthe new advance rate was muted by the special advance rate of
3.75 percent introduced in December 1927. The government clearly
understoodthe problem butwas constrained by the earliercommitment.
Given the lack of an active, open money market with international
connections and the secrecy governing the change in the advance rate,
the increase was clearly not intended to affect international capital flows
in the normalway. Indeed, it is betterto regard the new advance rate as a
"gold device," a method ofincreasing the cost to banks ofshipping gold.
As such, it was successful for a time. Although the Canadian dollar
remained outside the gold export point, there were only three shipments
ofgold during the balance ofJune and early July, and these were by the
government. However, in mid-July, when the discount on the Canadian
dollar increased, reaching 1/ 2 cent, private shipments occurred again.
Thus, when potential arbitrage profits were very large, advance-rate
policy failed. No further policy response occurred or was necessary. A
sudden but seasonally normal recovery ofthe exchange rate stopped the
gold outflow. The crisis apparently over, in early Septemberthe advance
rate was reduced from 5 percent to 4.5 percent.
6.4.4 The Second Gold Drain
For two months the Canadian dollar remained strong, but in mid-
September, when it would normally strengthen, it weakened; apart from
a brief burst above the gold import point in late November (when $22.5
million ofgold was imported), it remained below parbut within the gold
point. In early December it plunged through the gold export point, and
gold began to flow out. From30 November 1928 to 28 February1929, $60
million of gold was shipped, although because of purchases of newly
minedgold from the Royal Mint, official reserves fell by only $50 million.
Then the gold drain stopped. Indeed, private shipments stopped at the
end ofJanuary 1929. The government's shipment of$18 million to meet
foreign commitments during this period, while profitable, is puzzling,
given their concern about the gold-reserve ratio. The Canadian dollar
remained well outside the gold export point until mid-March 1930, and
the discount actually reached 2.5 cents after the stock-market collapse.297 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 192~35
The Policy Response
The government's initial reaction to the second gold drain was dif-
ferent; the advance rate was not increased, but other gold devices were
invoked. In mid-December 1928 the Canadian banks apparently agreed
not to ship gold for their own account, leaving open the question of
shipments on behalfofU.S. banks. Standard gold devices were used. By
law, gold should have been made available in Montreal, the normal
shipping point to New York. It was only made available at Ottawa,
adding to transportation costs (New York Times 1927a, 1927b). In
December 17 percent and in January 70 percent ofthe gold paid out was
bullion or British gold coin rather than U.S. coin. This gold had to be
assayed before it could be accepted by the U.S. authorities, adding to
transactions costs. When in mid-February 1929 the discount on the
Canadian dollar increased so that these gold devices could no longer be
relied upon, it seems to have been agreed that the banks would charge
prohibitive agent fees for handling the gold transactions offoreign banks
(as a matter of standing policy, the government would only make gold
available to Canadianbanks) (JournalofCommerce 1929a 1929b). When
the discount became so large that the necessary commission rates were
implausible, say by mid-March 1929, the banks appear simply to have
declined to purchase gold for foreign banks (Commercial and Financial
Chronicle1929, pp. 1107,1978). These gold devices were effective. From
the first week of February 1929 until December 1930, there were no
private shipments of gold from Canada.
6.4.5 The 1930 Respite
The exchange rate returned within the gold export point in mid-March
1930, and, apart from a two-week drop below the export point in early
May (when again no gold flowed out of Canada), the rate remained
within the gold points until mid-December. Indeed from July on, the
Canadian dollar had several brief bursts of strength, approaching the
estimated gold import point but never decisively breaking through it.
The 1930 Gold Inflow
On most occasions when the exchange rate touched the gold import
point, there were sizable shipments of gold to Montreal, but there were
also sizable shipments when the rate was well below the gold point. Over
the whole period, July through November, Canada received $36 million
ofgold, almost 60 percent of the drain during the crisis of 1928-29. The
responsiveness of gold flows to very marginal, and in some cases nega-
tive, profit margins astonished financial commentators. In part the ship-
ments were a response to market incentives created by the government
and in part a result of governmental purchases.298 Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
Although we have no direct evidence, there is strong circumstantial
evidence (from reports in the financial press) that the government was
purchasing gold in New Yorkto improve Canada'sgold-reserve position.
Such a policy was strongly urged at this time by the Canadian Bankers'
Association who were disturbed by the sharp decline ofthe gold-reserve
ratio below "what is deemed adequate . . . in the chief countries main-
taining the gold standard" (PAC Finance Records, group 19, box 105).
To the bankers, it was a matter of international confidence in Canadian
banks with extensive international business; to the government (needing
to roll over 44 percent ofCanada'sfunded debt in the next four years), it
was a matter ofsecuring "the lowest possible interest charges" (Canada,
House of Commons 1930).
We estimatethatgovernment shipmentswere between$15 million and
$16 million, over 40 percent of the total gold inflow.
Policy Measures: The Finance Act
Monetary policies reinforced the effects of gold purchases on the
official gold-reserve position, creating market incentives to ship gold to
Canada.
In spite of a sharp decline in interest rates worldwide, including cen-
tral-bank discount rates, the advance rate remained constant at 1928
levels, 4.5 percent (ordinary) and 3.75 percent (special). The sharp
widening of the differential between the advance rate and New York
interest rates (figure 6.7) created an incentive to import gold, either to
repay advances or as a substitute for advances to augment cash reserves,
in effect temporarily reducing the gold import point. Some sizable
shipmentswere made by U.S. banks, andtherewere reports ofAmerican
banksdiverting funds from New Yorkto lend in Canada. Advancesto the
banksfell by $21 million-59percentofthe totalgold inflow. This decline
was concentrated in July and August, before the seasonal expansion in
note circulation and in the demand for cash reserves, and essentially
paralleled the gold inflow.
A policy implemented 1 May, if maintained, would have strengthened
this effect. In an unprecedented action, the government severely cur-
tailed authorized lines ofcredit. Bank protests were loud and difficult to
ignore. Thepolicywas rescinded almost immediately, although threatsof
similar restrictions were repeated the following year.
The government reinforced these measures by using its deposits with
the banks to pay for a portion ofthe gold purchased by the mint, rather
than issuing Dominion notes, the normal practice. Through November,
$3.6 million of gold so purchased was added to "excess" gold reserves,
improving the official gold-reserve ratio without adding to the cash
reserves of the banks.
The 1930 episodeprovidesstrongevidence thatas in 1922 and 1924, the299 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
government had a policy designed to improve its gold-reserve position.
Three instruments were used: direct purchases of gold in New York,
creation of excess gold reserves, and a penalty advance rate. The com-
bined result was a small increase in Dominion-notes outstanding (a
normal seasonal adjustment) and a dramatic rise in the gold-reserve
ratio, from 37.7 percent on 30 June to 54.1 percent on 30 November.
Over the next five weeks, the normal seasonal drain of gold from
Canada occurred. With the dollar below the gold export point, $40
million of gold was shipped to New York. A few days after gold ship-
ments in mid-January had drained the last of the gold acquired in the
precedingmonths, thedollarrecoveredtowithinthegoldpoints, whereit
remained until early June 1931.
6.4.6 The Third Crisis
The final episode began on 10 June 1931 when the exchange rate went
outside the gold export point and culminated in October with an official
embargo on gold exports. In between, the discount on the Canadian
dollar ranged from 20/64ths during the summer, to one cent after 15
September, and plummeted to fourteen cents just before the embargo
was declared. But, in spite ofthese powerful market incentives, only $35
million of private gold shipments occurred, $18 million in June. During
July and August theoutflows substantiallystopped, resuming to a limited
extent in September and October before the embargo was declared. In
the five weeks between 15 September and 19 October when the profit
incentive for shipments was exceptional, only $8 or $9 million was ex-
ported.
Gold Policies
We found no records in the Public Archives relating to the govern-
ment's gold policies in this period. However, it is unlikely that even the
June outflow reflected a policy of unrestricted gold exports, and, again,
the cooperationofthe bankshad to beakey ingredient. Butthis time the
implicit restriction of exports elicited virtually no comment in the finan-
cial press. The policies of1929-30 were probably still fresh in everyone's
mind, so a reintroduction of such measures caused no surprise. During
September and October, with the market inducements for gold exports
exceptionally intense, the government allowed a trickle of gold out of
official reserves, maintaining the image, if not the substance, ofbeing on
the gold standard. But there was a new element in the problem. For the
first time the discount on the Canadian dollar was so deep that it was
profitable for the public to convert relatively small quantities ofDomin-
ion notes into gold and to demand the honoring of the gold-payment
clauses of some bond issues. The government's response ranged from
bureaucraticharassmentto outrightrefusal to convert. Theconvertibility300 Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
ofDominion notes and refusal to honor gold clauses became for the first
time political issues both inside and outside the country. The British
suspension of gold provided strong and timely justification for a formal
Canadian embargo.
6.4.7 Overview of the Suspension of the Gold Standard
The suspension of the gold standard in 1929 was achieved almost as
quietly as the resumption in 1924-26-although a significant political
uproar occurred later. In summarizing, we would emphasize the follow-
ing points.
1. The impetus behind the 1929 suspension was the sharp rise in the
New Yorkcall-loan ratewhich putsevere stress onthe Canadianforeign-
exchange market.
2. Contrary to some suggestions, the government was not unaware of
the nature ofthe problem and initially attempted tried-and-true central-
banking techniques to deal with it-in the first crisis gold devices and
advance-rate policy, and in the second crisis more gold devices-before
secretly imposing an embargo on gold exports. In subsequent crises the
government continued theembargo until itwas legitimized by the British
suspension. The government had the full support ofthe Canadian bank-
ers and the tacit approval of the government of the United States.
We surmise that the lesson drawn by the Canadian government from
this experience was that classical policies could only cope with minor
external pressures. Although it can be argued that the measures were
half-hearted at best, the situation was very difficult. The Canadian gold
points were exceptionally narrow, and some Canadian banks were very
alert to potential gold-arbitrage profits. Moreover, there was a serious
institutional gap. Canada had no open money market with international
connections, so while the response ofinternational capital flows to more
vigorous use ofthe advance rate might have beenin the right direction, it
would have been sluggish.
6.5 Conclusions
Canada's interwar experience with the gold standard is paradoxical.
Withouta centralbank, butas aresultofinterest-ratepoliciesputinplace
by accident, the gold standard was quietly and efficiently restored.
However, when the DepartmentofFinance discovered its capacityto act
like acentralbank,itsoperationswere afailure andthegold standardwas
suspended at the first sign ofsignificant external stress. Partofthe reason
for the failure was that it had earlier launched a policy of using the
Finance Act to support short-term government financing, which predict-
ably undermined the developing concept of gold standard central-
banking. The major reason for the failure, however, was the rigidity of301 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 192~35
the gold standard in the Canadian case. In the absence of substantial
excessgold reserves, a 100percentmarginalreserve requirementleft very
little room to maneuver in the event ofa gold drain; and the gold points
between Canada and the United States were narrower thanfor any other
pair ofmajor industrial countries. Exchange-rate movements that would
havehadnoconsequenceselsewhere, elicitedmajorgoldmovements and
potentially serious monetary distress.
Although from time to time the governmentformulated policy with an
eye to the gold-reserve ratio, evenwhen Canadawas formally ongold the
government showed no commitment to the gold standard as a monetary-
control mechanism, other than for seasonal adjustments. The discipline
was too severe.
Notes
1. Against deposits there were no reserve requirements; the banks held whatever
"prudent practice" and market incentives dictated. There was a 100 percent reserve
requirement against any "excess circulation" (over paid-up capital) of bank notes, but
econometric evidence suggests that the banks largely treated these reserves as a substitute
for reserves they would otherwise have held in their vaults (Clark and Shearer 1975).
2. We define the gold-covered issue as that part of the Dominion-note issue against
which 100 percent gold reserves were required, i.e., the total issue ofDominion notes less
the fiat issues permitted under the Dominion Notes Act and the Finance Act, and the 1917
"British issue." The gold-covered issue is not quite identical with actual gold reserves
because of small holdings of excess gold reserves.
3. We have includedin the monetary base gold held by the banks outside Canada onthe
grounds that this gold was almost immediately available to the banks for use in Canada, if
necessary, attrivial transactionscosts (ClarkandShearer1975). Onthe otherhand, we have
excluded from the monetary base any excess gold held by the government over and above
the legal requirement on the grounds that this gold was not monetized. Alternative defini-
tions of the monetary base, excluding bank gold abroad or including government excess
gold, do not affect the general conclusions drawn here.
4. Thedataongold flows, daily exchange rates, andgold points (andtheirinterpretation
onthe basisofmaterialin the PublicArchives and thefinancial press) onwhich this sectionis
based are fully documented in Clark and Shearer 1980.
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Comment Charles Freedman
Shearer and Clark have written a very detailed, scholarly analysis of
monetary policy in Canada in the period between the end of the First
World War and the creation of the central bank. As an economist
working in a central bank and trained in the type ofmonetarytheory that
takesthe existenceofa centralbankas an institutionaldatum, I found the
discussion of the mechanics of a system without a central bank both
interesting and useful.
The principal weakness of the Shearer-Clark paper is the lack of a
carefully articulated theoretical model that would place the analysis of
the behavior ofthe financial sector within a general-equilibrium context
and would permit us to contrast such behavior with that implied in the
current institutional environment. A particularly important aspect of
such a formalization would be to focus the attention of the reader on
which variables are endogenous or exogenous in different possible re-
gimes and which exogenous shocks were affecting the system. I would
like to begin my comments on Shearer and Clark by sketching outsuch a
model.
A fairly standard textbook model ofan open economy is comprised of
four equations-(l) an IS curve in which output is determined as a
function of the interest rate and exchange rate; (2) a price equation in
which prices adjust to the gap between output and full-employment
output; (3) a balance-of-payments equation in which the sum of the
current account, the capital account, and the change in international
reserves is set equal to zero;! and (4) an LM curve in which the demand
for central-bank money is equated to its supply. The supply of central-
bankmoneyin such a model is equalto the sum ofdomesticassets andnet
foreign assets (i.e., international reserves) held by the authorities. Be-
cause ofthe importance ofthe LM curve in the discussion thatfollows, it
is worthwritingit explicitlyfor thecase ofan economywith acentralbank
that imposes mandatory reserve requirements.
(1) kD(·) + C(·) +RE(') = NDA + NFA +RB(')'
The demand for central-bankmoneyorbase is equalto required reserves
(kD) plus currency (C) plus excess reserves (RE), and the supply of
central-bank money is equal to the net domestic assets (NDA) plus the
Charles Freedman is chiefofthe DepartmentofMonetary and FinancialAnalysis, Bank
of Canada.
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net foreign assets (NFA) of the relevant authorities plus the borrowed
reserves of the banking system (RB), if any.
Thereare threedifferent regimes thatcanbeanalyzedin the contextof
this simple model. In the pure flexible-exchange-rate system, the level of
international reserves, NFA, is held constant and the endogenous vari-
ables are the interest rate, output, prices, and the exchange rate. The
level of NDA is an exogenous variable. In a fixed-exchange-rate world
with sterilization ofchanges in international reserve holdings, changes in
NDA areusedtooffsetchangesinNFA andtheendogenousvariables are
the interest rate, output, prices, and the level of international reserves.
Finally, in a fixed-exchange-rate world without sterilization, the author-
ities do not attempt to use NDA to offset changes in NFA and the
endogenous variables remain the interest rate, output, prices, and the
level of international reserves.
Two basicsetsofpropositions arederivedfrom this type ofmodel. The
first relates to the effect on the system of an exogenous shock in the
capital flow or the current account. The second focuses on the effects of
an exogenous change in the level of net domestic assets held by the
monetary authorities.
In analyzing the structure of the Canadian economy in the period
between World War I and the establishment of the Bank of Canada in
1935, one can treat the equations representing the equilibrium in the
goods market, the determination ofprices, and the balance-of-payments
equilibrium as being roughly similarin structure to those in the post-1935
period. There are, however, a numberofimportantchangesthatmust be
madetotheequationrepresentingthefinancial structureoftheeconomy.
First, reserves against deposits were not mandatory. Second, notes
issued by the chartered banks above a certain level had to be backed 100
percent by either Dominion notes orgold. Third, under the Finance Act
the banks could borrow Dominion notes at an advance rate set by the
government of Canada~ Fourth, the government required 100 percent
gold backing for issues of Dominion notes beyond the fiduciary issue
except for those issued under the Finance Act. Fifth, the Canadian
money market was very underdeveloped and Canadian banks made
extensive use of the New York money market.
Ignoring the fiduciary portion of the note issue and focusing only on
marginal responses, one can write the equation that shows the equality
between the demand and supply of Dominion notes as
(2) DN(·)=GG+FAB(·),
where DN is the demand for Dominion notes, GG is government hold-
ings of gold, and FAB are bank borrowings under the Finance Act. The
demand for reserves by the banking system and the supply ofreserves to
the banking system can be depicted as305 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
(3) k( 0 )D( 0 ) + BN( 0 ) = GB + DNB,
where BN are bank-notes outstanding, GB are bank holdings of gold,
and DNB are bank holdings of Dominion notes.
2 Adding the two equa-
tions one gets
(4) k( 0)D(·) + BN(·) + [DN( 0) - DNB]
=GG+GB+FAB(o).
This equationmore closely resembles the traditional LMequationin that
the sum of the precautionary reserves held against deposits and the
currency held outside the banking system is equal to the gold holdings
plus borrowings by the banks from the authorities. Note that there is no
equivalent to NDA in this system.
Writing the LM equation in this form immediately raises a number of
questions. First, did the government hold foreign exchange (e.g., de-
posits in New York banks) against which no notes were issued but which
could be transformed into gold if desired? The authors indicate that the
government on occasion made direct purchases ofgold in New York but
do not explain how these were financed. Second, what determined
whether a gold inflow was held by the banks or by the government?
Third,werethebankspreparedto use theirforeign-currency liquid assets
in New York or their ability to raise deposits from U.S. residents to
augment their gold holdings when they were short of reserves? That is,
could the banks create a capital inflow by selling U.S. dollar assets and
bringing the gold proceeds back to Canada? Rich (this volume, chap. 12)
cites a number of sources that indicate the banks did this in the period
preceding World War I. All these questions relate to the endogeneity of
the reserve base of the chartered banks.
A second set of questions relates to the determinants of the desired
holding ofreserves by the chartered banks. First, what factors influenced
the behavior of the ratio of reserves to deposits of the banks? Rich has
suggested that in the period before World War I there was a significant
relationship between that ratio and income such that when income rose,
the reserve requirement was permitted to fall, and the stock of money
could increase without an increase in the level of reserves. Shearer and
Clarksuggest thattherewas no such relationshipin thepostwarperiod, at
least in the early 1920s, but their analysis is in terms ofthe overall money
multiplier. The latter can of course be influenced by a switch between
notes (with 100 percent reserves) and deposits. Second, what factors
entered into the determination of the use by the banks of advances, a
device onwhich the authorsfocus a great deal ofattention in their study?
One possibility is the differential between the rate charged on advances
and the rate available on liquid assets in New York (as suggested by the
authors). Alternatively, the relevant differential could be that between306 Ronald A. Shearer and Carolyn Clark
the rate charged on advances and that available on assets in Canada,
either explicitly in the Montreal money market or implicitly in terms of
the marginal return on an increase in bank loans to business. The differ-
entassumptions lead to very different conclusions regardingthe effect on
the variables ofthe system ofa change in the rate on advances. Consider,
for example, the effect ofa decline in the rate on advances. If the banks
used the funds from the now cheaper advances to invest in V.S. short-
term assets, the results would be a capital outflow, a reduction in gold
holdings ofthe authorities, and no change in the Canadian money stock.
There would simply be a reduction in gold-backed Dominion notes to
offset theincreasein Dominionnotesissued undertheFinance Act. (This
result would beequivalentto the effect ofan increase ofNDA onNFA in
a fixed-exchange-rate system with infinitely elastic capital flows.) Alter-
natively, if the advances were used to buy Canadian liquid assets or to
increase loans to Canadian business, the result would be an increase in
the Canadian money stock. Thus the specification of the functional
arguments in the expression for borrowed reserves can be very crucial in
determining the outcome ofconceptual experiments regarding a shift in
exogenous variables.
Shearer and Clark analyze the period leading to the restoration ofthe
gold standard and that leading to the departure from the gold standard.
Intheformer theyemphasize the role ofadvances undertheFinance Act,
and in the latter they focus on both the balance of payments and the
advances under the Finance Act.
In their discussion of the period leading to the return to the gold
standard, Shearer and Clark suggest that the main factor permitting such
a return to the gold standard without undue hardship was the decline of
the Canadian money stock both absolutely and relative to the V.S.
moneystock. Since the multiplierwas fairly constantoverthe period, this
decline resulted from a decline in the monetary base. Turning to the
components of the monetary base, one can see that gold was fairly flat
over the period and that the decline in base resulted from the decline in
fiat issues related to advances under the Finance Act. The authors do not
address directly the question ofwhy gold holdings were relatively stable.
Presumably, this stability resulted from developments in the Canadian
balance ofpayments. Given theemphasis in the laterpartofthepaperon
capital flows and their effect on total gold reserves, it would have been
useful, if only by way of contrast, to discuss these developments in the
first half of the decade.
Since it was thedeclinein thefiat issues thatturnedoutto bethecrucial
element in the decline of the base, the authors spend the greater part of
the first section of the paper discussing possible causes of this decline,
including the setting of lines of credit for advances, the availability of307 Canada and the Interwar Gold Standard, 1920-35
collateral for advances, and the rate on advances. In the main, it was the
latter two factors and most especially the rate on advances that were
crucial in the reduction of the monetary base. Following the argument
made above, it must have been the return on Canadian investments or
loans that was the alternative rate relevant to the banks and not a U.S.
rate since in the latter case there would have been offsetting movements
between gold-backed not~s and those issued under the Finance Act.
I think that the authors are correct in concluding that there was no
conscious grand design in monetary policy to restore the gold standard.
George Watts, a long-time studentofCanadian monetarypolicy, assures
me that there was no body of principles generally recognized by the
Canadian authorities at the time that permitted them to act in such a way
as to ease the return to gold.
In their discussion of the later period, the authors focus on both the
advance rate set by the authorities and on the changes in international
reserves resultingfrom balance-of-paymentsflows. Again, onemustraise
the question ofthe considerationsthatinfluencedthe banksin theiruseof
advances. If it were the comparison with U.S. rates, then there would
have been a link between the rate on advances, capital outflows, and
hence the gold stock, without any change necessarily taking place in the
money stock. However, to the extent that the banks responded to the
difference between the rate on advances and interest rates in Canada, a
relatively low rate on advances would lead to an increase in the Canadian
money stock and hence increases in output, prices, and a gold outflow.
The authors focus mainly on the former scenario although recognizing
that there was also an increase in the money stock. An alternative
hypothesis that would be consistent with the data is that a key element in
explaining the money-stock increase in Canada in the late 1920s was the
Canadianexpansion ofthis time which derived from the NorthAmerican
boom of the period. The increase in income caused increases in both
loans and money demand which were satisfied by the chartered banks.
The latter, in turn, were able to satisfy their desire for reserves by
borrowing under the Finance Act at rates that were very attractive. To
distinguish between the various hypotheses would require a careful artic-
ulation of a general-equilibrium framework.
There are a number of other interesting elements discussed in the
Shearer and Clark paper, such as the relationship between the price of
gold and the relative costs of borrowing in New York and borrowing
under the Finance Act, the use ofgold devices, and the response by the
authorities to the gold flows at theendofthe 1920s and in theearly 1930s.
The detailed and scholarly analysis of these and other aspects of Cana-
dian monetarypolicyin thisperiodwill proveveryuseful to thestudentof
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Notes
1. By specifying the arguments carefully, this equation can be consistent with either
stock models orflow models ofexternal transactions. Furthermorebysettingcertainpartial
derivatives equal to infinity, this equation can also represent a world of infinitely elastic
capital flows.
2. The assertionofShearerandClark (note 1) thatthe banks behavedas iftheirreserves
against excess note issueswere asubstitutefor cash reserves theywouldotherwise have held
can be captured by either putting a coefficient between 0 and 1on BNor putting BNas an
argument in the k function.
General Discussion
CAGAN was struck by the authors' statement that Canada returned to
the gold standard by accident, for the same statement has been made
aboutthe UnitedStatesin 1879. Inthe UnitedStatesthegovernmentsaid
it was going to go back on gold, and, with the implementation of no
particular policy, the dollar just went back. Perhaps if by accident a
country can get close enough to equilibrium, then the market will do the
rest ofthework, because no onehas anincentive to ask for gold as long as
peopleareconvincedthatthegovernmentwill always be able orwilling to
take the steps necesssary to maintain convertibility. Inotherwords, once
the economy is within a certain distance ofequilibrium, it snaps back to
equilibrium, and any subsequent adjustment takes place gradually over
time.
WHITE drew attention to a number of references in the paper to the
"imperfect" development of monetary mechanisms. White was curious
to have the authors specify exactly what was lacking.
SHEARER responded by citing the difficulty ofcontrolling the monetary
base. Canada had no central bank to worry about the availability of
credit. There was no provision for an agency to conduct open-market
operations. There was no money market, and virtually no market in
which short-term securities were traded. There was a discount rate fixed
at minimum by statute, but the discount rate had no signaling effect, at
least to the economy as a whole. It wasn't even published. On only one
occasion in the period studied did newspapers comment on a change in
the discount rate.
BORDO asked about the role of the Bank of Montreal and other large
Canadiancommercial banksin this period. Hethoughtthatin some ways
the Canadian experience may have been similar to the experience ofthe
UnitedStatesin theearlypartofthe nineteenthcentury, e.g., theSuffolk
banking system. In particular, having a large commercial bank commit-
ted to the maintenance of convertibility may be sufficient to ensure the
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SHEARER noted that the Bank ofMontreal was the government's fiscal
agent. It held the government's bank account and was a source ofadvice
on monetary matters. However, there is no evidence that it performed
any central-banking functions.
Shearer returned to the issue of the paper's exogeneity assumptions.
Essentially, the authors assume that two variables were exogenous: the
level ofBritish indebtedness to Canadian banks and the level ofinterest
rates.
Shearer reported the results ofeconometric work on banks' demands
for advances and reserves. The banks' demands for advances appear to
have been determined on the basis of a profit-maximizing decision. The
determination of the demand for bank reserves, on the other hand, is
very complicated indeed. Variations in the level of notes and deposits
outstanding seem to have very different effects on the level of reserves.
Moreover, reserve behavior appears to have depended on whether Can-
ada was on or off the gold standard.
Finally, Shearer commented on the role of gold in the early period.
Why was its level constant? The answer is that Canada was on a flexible
exchange-rate system and there was an embargo against the export of
gold. Little gold moved out of either the banks' or the government's
reserves.